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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tony James Gifford pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine, but reserved the right to
challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. Mindful that substantial evidence
supports the district court's conclusion that Mr. Gifford failed to use his tum signal as required
by Idaho Code 49-808, he contends that he did use his tum signal and thus Deputy Bestor did not
have reasonable suspicion to seize him. This Court should vacate Mr. Gifford's judgment of
conviction, reverse the order denying the motion to suppress, and remand this case for further
proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Deputy Bestor pulled Mr. Gifford over for purportedly failing to use his tum signal, and
then found what he believed to be methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the van
Mr. Gifford was driving. (R., pp.21-22.) The State charged Mr. Gifford with possession of
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.2728.)
Mr. Gifford moved to suppress all of the evidence against him, arguing that Deputy
Bestor did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop. (R., p.35; Tr., p.10, L.16-p.11, L.1.) At
the hearing on the suppression motion, the State called Deputy Bestor, who testified that he had a
clear view of the van Mr. Gifford was driving as it turned onto a road from a gas station parking
lot without signaling. (Tr., p.11, L.15-p.16, L.10, p.25, Ls.14-16.) To counter that testimony,
defense counsel called Mr. Gifford and his father, who was in the passenger seat of the van, both
of whom testified that Mr. Gifford had used his tum signal and that Mr. Gifford had told Deputy
Bestor as much during the traffic stop. (Tr., p.32, L.15-p.33, L.1, p.40, Ls.6-22, p.51, Ls.2-10,
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p.52, Ls.7-15.) Mr. Gifford and his father also acknowledged that the turn signal on the van
sometimes clicks off prematurely, before a tum is completed, and they could not say exactly how
long the tum signal had been on when Mr. Gifford pulled out of the gas station parking lot.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.23-25, p.36, Ls.7-16, p.51, Ls.6-8, p.56, Ls.7-16.) In rebuttal, the State called
Mr. Casper, a citizen who happened to have been on ride-along with Deputy Bestor during
Mr. Gifford's traffic stop. (Tr., p.64, L.15-p.65, L.18.) Mr. Casper testified that Deputy Bestor
told him, before pulling the van over, that the owner of the van had been stopped for meth
before, and so "we'll stop and see if there's anything suspicious." (Tr., p.66, Ls.1-10.) Deputy
Bestor parked across the road, and when they saw the van tum without signaling, Deputy Bestor
told Mr. Casper that was enough for them to pull the van over.

(Tr., p.66, Ls.11-19.)

Mr. Casper confirmed that the van did not use a tum signal. (Tr., p.67, Ls.6-10.)
The district court denied Mr. Gifford's suppression motion. It explained that it did not
hear any evidence to make it believe that Deputy Bestor had made up a reason for the stop or that
he testified untruthfully, and noted that this was an unusual case because Mr. Casper was riding
along with Deputy Bestor. (Tr., p.80, L.15-p.81, L.1.) It also noted that even if Deputy Bestor
was looking for a reason to stop the van, that doesn't make the stop unconstitutional so long as
there was actually reasonable suspicion for the stop. (Tr., p.81, Ls.2--4.) It concluded,
[T]he preponderance of the evidence does support the fact that the officer has
stated were [sic] the basis for the stop, which is the tum signal wasn't working.
Now, I know there's some dispute about whether it was working the whole time
or not. Even if I based it on the defendant's testimony under 49-808, it's very
clear that the turn indicator has to be continuously on for a period of five seconds.
So, technically, if it wasn't functioning for either a second or two that would be a
violation ofldaho Code 49-808.
Now, I realize that's not what the officer is saying. He's saying it wasn't
on at all; but if I believe the defendant's version, that would likely be enough to
establish probable cause that it wasn't on, and of course the officer just needed a
reasonable suspicion.
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So after considering all of those factors in this case, I want to be clear this
is a case where I'm just not hearing two diametrically opposed stories; and I'm
giving the cop the benefit of the doubt. I want to be very clear that's not what's
happening here. I've looked at all of the circumstances, and all of the
circumstances present in this case create in the Court an abiding belief that the
facts that the officer used to fmd reasonable suspicion have been established by a
preponderance of the evidence by the state. So I'm going to deny the motion to
suppress at this time.
(Tr., p.83, L.4-84, L.6.)
Mr. Gifford later pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine, but reserved the right to
challenge the district court's denial of his suppression motion on appeal. (Tr., p.86, L.20-p.87,
L.4.) In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to
recommend probation. (Tr., p.86, L.20-87, L.4.) The district court sentenced Mr. Gifford to six
years, with two of those years fixed, but suspended that sentence and placed him on probation.
(R., pp.75-78.)
Mr. Gifford timely appealed. (R., pp.82-85.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gifford's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gifford's Motion To Suppress
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.

State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that the search or seizure falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement and was reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 219; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds
in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.

If the

government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or
seizure, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is
inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 518-19 (2012).
To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless seizures must generally be
based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). However, limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when "justified by an officer's reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime."

State v. Morgan,

154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires
more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time
of the stop." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district court's factual
findings unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review over questions of statutory
construction and the district court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts
found. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470 (2001). Factual findings are clearly erroneous if
they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

State v. Linenberger,

151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011).
Mindful that substantial evidence in the record supported the district court's factual
finding that Mr. Gifford did not use his tum signal for at least five continuous seconds, see
Linenberger, 151 Idaho at 686; LC. 49-808(2); Tr., p.12, L.20-p.13, L.11, p.67, Ls.6-10,

Mr. Gifford nevertheless maintains that he did use his tum signal properly.

Therefore,

reasonable suspicion did not support the stop, and all of the evidence seized as a result must be
suppressed. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485; Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518-19; Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gifford respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the order denying the motion to suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 15 th day of July, 2020.

I sf Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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